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The theme of gestation for others (GPA), more commonly known as ‘surrogacy’, is very 
complex. Nevertheless, the public and scientific debates do not focus much on it; when 
they do, this is often seen from the wrong perspective, as has recently happened in the 
Italian debate, which has stood out for its poverty: a simple ideological opposition between 
those for and against GPA.  
We believe it necessary to deepen the analysis and expand the debate, since people’s 
lives – and women’s lives in particular – are at play. This round table is a first attempt to 
make a contribution in this direction, arguing more calmly and going into a number of 
ethical issues raised by the spread of GPA. 
Therefore, taking into account a perhaps irreducible complexity, trying to throw a little 
light on the issue, it seemed important to start adopting the perspective of women, who are 
																																								 																				
1 Associate professor in Philosophy of Law, University of Brescia, Italy. 
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the protagonists of this story, clearly remaining well aware that the issue involves other 
subjects and raises further problems.  
We start from the premise that technology now makes it possible to develop a type of 
GPA by artificial insemination that seems to introduce changes that could give the practice 
a new function, and therefore a new value. In particular, it is now also possible for the 
intentional mothers who have eggs to be inseminated to perpetuate their genes in the 
offspring. This equates to some extent the position of the woman who brings the eggs to 
that of the man who brings the sperm (it being understood that the conditions through 
which we obtain the gametes of one and the other are very different).  
Although the practice of surrogacy is ancient and has developed within a homosocial 
culture2, one wonders if the new biomedical technologies can make it overcome the 
original patriarchal connotations3 and allow us to read it today as a case of female 
empowerment. Or, conversely, one wonders whether it should be considered as a further 
step in the wake of patriarchy, because the equality of the intentional mother is obtained by 
positioning her as the father who, after yielding his genes, waits for another woman to 
handle pregnancy and give birth to the offspring he wants to be a parent of.  
We wonder then how to make out the relationship of equality / difference with regard to 
the birth mother, who, once separated from the child thanks to someone else’s embryo, is 
likely to be perceived as a mere container, destined to guard something that does not 
belong to her. Thus, the question arises whether the focus on genetics, typical of 
contemporary society, may perhaps, paradoxically, weaken the importance given to human 
relationships in favor of that recognized to the ownership of seeds.  
The round table presented here is intended as a first approach or attempt to solicit a 
serene and thoughtful debate on the so called ‘gestation for others’ or ‘surrogacy’. A 
practice that is spreading with considerable speed, but has not received adequate attention 
as regards its reasons or motive, nor its implications and effects. We believe instead that 
																																								 																				
2 I.e., where social and political issues revolve only around men. 
3 The GPA was pursuing the goal to transfer the patriarch’s genes to the offspring, through the use of a 
woman other than his wife, and then raising the progeny in the father’s family, excluding the birth mother. 
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the issue deserves to be placed at the center, so that one of the tasks we are given is to 
bring to light what the mainstream discourse, to different extents, conceals or 
misrepresents, accustomed as it is to traditional schemes and interests. 
For a first approach to the issue, we chose to address only two general questions and for 
the occasion it was decided to interview only women, as subjects directly concerned by the 
practice. For the first exchange of ideas, we chose women within the European academic 
area, that is, from a space where the practice is evolving; we decided, however, to also add 
an intervention by an American scholar, that is from a space where women have been 
urging attention to the issue for a long time. Our interviewees were sent a track, but also an 
invitation to feel free to start a reflection on such terms as they considered most 
appropriate or interesting or incisive. We chose to give them the floor in alphabetical order, 
with one exception. Neither has every point, as the reader can easily notice, obtained the 
same attention in this occasion of debate. Since the European interviewees mainly 
focalized on the legal aspect, avoiding in some sense the feminist inquire, we decided to 
give the floor first to the two interviewees that focalized on feminism, as suggested with 
the first question, thus subverting the order, by following Barbara Katz Rothman’s 
contribution, as she focused on this aspect, too. We hope that, in the next RT, this could act 
as a driving force for the development of this aspect of the matter. We want to underline 
once again that this Round Table is only meant to be the first step to a larger debate, 
spanning different perspectives and disciplines. 
 
1. However, there are different opinions about surrogacy even between 
feminists. From your theoretical perspective, which point(s) is/are not 




Antonia Durán Ayago4 (University of Salamanca, Spain) − First, I would like to clarify 
that I do not consider myself to be a feminist, at least, not a militant or activist of this 
movement. Simply, I believe in the royal equality of sexes and act in consequence. 
I am aware that in feminism there is no unanimous position about the surrogacy 
arrangements, which on the other hand is normal, because feminism itself is not a 
homogenous movement. But it is also true that, so far, the positions on gestation 
substitution in feminism have basically revolved around two poles: for and against it. 
Those against argue that women’s bodies cannot be used as a commodity and hypothesize 
that women who choose to gestate other people's children are exploited, that people take 
advantage of their situation of economic weakness to achieve their objectives. The 
movement No somos vasijas http://nosomosvasijas.eu/ represents this sector faithfully. 
On the other side are those who believe that women are perfectly independent to decide 
whether or not to donate their ability to gestate to others who need it, emphasize the act of 
solidarity involving surrogacy arrangements and reject maximalist approaches imposing 
what women can or cannot do.  
I’m with the latter sector. In Spain, the possibility is being considered of regulating this 
technique to primarily protect the children born as a result of it, eliminating the uncertainty 
of their parentage and ensuring that the pregnant woman has given her free and informed 
consent. A grant from the ability to gestate is being proposed, so that the contract would be 
free, there would be no payment but simply compensation, just like is already being done 
with donor eggs and sperm. ### 
 
Anika König5 (Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, and Universität Luzern, Switzerland) − 
Empirical research shows that there are great differences between the ways in which 
surrogacy is performed. This depends on the country and its legal regulations, but also on 
																																								 																				
4 She is professor of International private law at the University of Salamanca. She has published many works 
on the theme and the most significant can be read at the direction: http://diarium.usal.es/aduran/bibliografia/  
5 She started working on surrogacy in 2012. She is particularly interested in the networks that link intended 
parents (particularly from the German-speaking region), surrogates, medical professionals, agencies, lawyers 
and other actors in the surrogacy business. Her research is based on the multi-sitedness of the issue of 
surrogacy, especially the movements of people, tissue, technologies, knowledge, and money. 
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the agencies, clinics, doctors and lawyers, who are involved. Finally, there is a wide range 
of women who decide to become surrogates – ranging from women in financial despair – 
often living in so-called developing countries – to those who voluntarily decide to become 
pregnant for others. As a result, it is difficult to make general statements about surrogacy.  
However, it is certainly not negotiable that the wellbeing and rights of the surrogate 
mother and the child that is born through surrogacy must be protected. But even such a 
simple statement already poses a first problem: how do we define something like 
‘wellbeing’? May the term refer to financial stability, happiness, or physical and/or mental 
health – just to name a few possible forms of wellbeing? And what do we understand as 
the ‘rights’ that are appropriate for the surrogate and the child? While especially in Euro-
American cultures the right to know one’s origin is very highly valued, this is not 
necessarily true for other parts of the world.  
In interviews I have done with surrogates in the United States, some of them said that 
they were fine with the fact that the child was not theirs and that they did not find it 
difficult to give it up after birth. What they complained about was the fact that they were 
often presented as oppressed and passive women without rights. They found this offensive 
because they were very well aware of their rights and felt empowered through surrogacy 
rather than disempowered. It was the public view of surrogacy, and not surrogacy itself, 
that made them feel disempowered because their voices were not heard and their views 
ignored (which, interestingly, is similar to the discussions on sex work).  
Moreover, with our current terminology and concept of kinship, ties that have been 
created through surrogacy are still difficult to describe. So we cannot tell whether the egg 
donor, the gestational surrogate, or the social mother is the ‘real’ mother. Or does the child 
possibly have three mothers – a genetic, a gestational, and a social mother? While, from a 
legal point of view, in some countries the woman who gives birth to a child is regarded to 
be the child’s mother, in others the social mother is seen as the mother. This shows that 
there is no simple answer to this question. Perhaps we have to move away from traditional 
concepts of kinship and descent and, rather than banning family forms that are new or 
different, find ways to integrate them into the existing system.  
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Generally, it seems to me that researchers, politicians and the public spend a lot of time 
speaking about surrogacy and the people involved in it, but that very few of the latter are 
allowed to speak for themselves. If we want to learn more about surrogacy and what it 
means especially for the surrogate mothers and the children, we should try to include them 
and their opinions much more in the discussion. 
 
Barbara Katz Rothman6 (University of New York, U.S.A.) − What is not negotiable for 
me is this: Every pregnant woman is the mother of the child in her body and must have full 
legal, social, cultural and political rights over her body and thus the potential child. 
This means that I reject the concept of ‘surrogacy’ − in a pregnancy one is not in a 
‘substitute’ or ‘replacement’ or ‘surrogate’ relationship − the woman and the baby are in an 
intimate physical and social relationship.  
Surrogacy is based on the rejection of the primacy of relationships and rather on the 
assumption of the primacy of intentions, and the primacy of the genetic tie. I reject both and 
ask us to respect the existing intimate, physical, psychological and social relationship that is 
pregnancy.  
Mothers feel their babies’ movement, but the relationship is yet more intimate: blood is 
mingled, the fluids of life are mixed. Fetal cells are in maternal circulation; maternal 
muscle and blood hold and nurture the forthcoming child. 
Fetuses are cradled in amniotic fluid that smells of the garlic, curry, paprika, or fennel of 
their mother’s diet. They learn the sound of their mother’s voice and the language she 
speaks. At birth, newborn babies demonstrate recognition of all of that: language, smell, 
voice. 
																																								 																				
6 She is (PhD) Professor of Sociology, Public Health, Disability Studies and Women’s Studies at the City 
University of New York, where she runs the Food Studies concentration. Her books include In Labor; The 
Tentative Pregnancy; Recreating Motherhood; The Book Of Life; Weaving A Family: Untangling Race and 
Adoption; Laboring On (with Wendy Simonds), and The New Bun in the Oven: How the Food and Birth 
Movements Resist Industrialization. She is Past President of Sociologists for Women in Society; the Society 
for the Study of Social Problems, and the Eastern Sociological Society. She is proud recipient of an award for 
“Midwifing the Movement” from the Midwives Alliance of North America.  
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Those who speak of surrogacy are able to dismiss a woman who might be standing 
before them, heavily pregnant, ankles swollen, belly extended, the movement of the baby 
within observable through her clothing, as a “gestational carrier”, while viewing the 
purchasers as “intended parents”. The business of ‘surrogacy’ puts enormous weight on 
intentionality in parenthood. No society has ever offered this as a definition of parenthood. 
If intentionality made parents, most people would have been orphans. Parenting is a 
relationship, and not an intention. 
Our law has recognized that intentions and desire do not determine parenthood: In cases 
of adoption, no matter what the agreements decided upon before the birth of the child, the 
mother is the parent of the child she births. Nothing in that pregnancy relationship is 
changed by changing the source of the egg or the sperm. Surrogacy is a form of adoption 
and the rights of birth mothers must continue to apply: a woman who births a child is the 
birth mother of that child. Some children would not exist but for rapists, and women who 
have been raped most assuredly entered into the pregnancy without the desire or intention 
for a child. Yet we would hardly claim that such children can be removed from the mother 
against her will because she did not ‘intend’ her motherhood. At the time of birth, 
motherhood is a fact determined by the lived physical experience, and not by the intentions 
of the parties who began the pregnancy. 
The second presumption of surrogacy is the genetic tie, the idea that a child is the 
product of the seed. This concept has its roots in our patriarchal history, in which men ruled 
as fathers. Men can and do rule over women all over the world, but in the Judeo-Islamic-
Christian tradition, that rule is based on the idea that children are the product of men, 
planted within women. It is this that made what is called ‘biblical surrogacy’ quite palatable 
– Hagar and others who substituted for a ‘barren’ wife were not surrogate mothers: they 
were surrogate wives. They were the mothers of the children they bore, but like all mothers, 
had no rights over those children. The seed of Abraham was to cover the world; Daddy 
plants a seed in Mommy, and Mrs. John Smith bears John Smith Junior. In this tradition, 
women are a vulnerability men share in achieving the next generation. 
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It is not much more than a century since the ovum was recognized as ‘equal’ to the 
sperm in its genetic contribution. And now we speak of ‘three parents’, separating out the 
mitochondria and the nuclear contribution of the ovum, but still dismissing pregnancy, and 
speaking of “natural” desires for genetically related children.  
In sum, accepting the primacy of genetics and intention, this is how surrogacy works: 
Women donate eggs because they need the money. Like the owner of a used car lot donates 
cars for money. Or the guy on Craig’s list who donated the couch I bought from him. 
Donate. That used to mean sell, but not in this context.  
Those donated eggs do not make the ‘donors’ mothers of the children so produced. It’s 
only an egg, after all, a medical procedure a woman undergoes for money, so it doesn’t 
have anything to do with her motherhood.  
Then this same woman who donated an egg for money needs more money so she gets 
pregnant with a zygote made out of someone else’s donated egg. It might be a purchased 
egg, so if a gay man or a woman who can’t make eggs buy an egg, they own it and it’s 
theirs. It’s not the egg of the seller. Excuse me, I meant donor. It belongs to the people 
who purchased that donated egg. So it’s theirs. 
But the woman who gets pregnant with that egg, she’s not the mother of course because 
it’s not her egg. It belongs to… the woman who sold it? No, no, remember, that is not what 
makes her a mother. The purchaser! That’s the real mother. OK, all clear now? 
And we all know that you can hire someone to do as much of the childcare work as you 
want or need to, and that won’t make her the mother. So, if someone wants to, they can 
purchase an egg from the person who donates it, hire that same woman to be pregnant, then 
hire her to raise the child for a few years. And she will have no rights over the child. That’s 
our new world of surrogacy. Or wait, actually – isn’t that the old one? A man could buy a 
woman from her father, marry her, get her pregnant and if he wanted the child, this child of 
his seed and intention, she had no legal rights over it. The only difference I see is that now, 
with our wonderful new technology and enlightened view of women, women can do the 
same thing that men used to be able to do. 
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I cannot accept a feminism that simply gives women of wealth and means all of the 
rights and privileges of wealthy men, including rights over the bodies of poorer and less 
privileged women.  
Nor can I accept a world in which relationships are discounted in favor of ownership.  
If we want to permit baby-selling, then we should create legislation that permits baby-
selling, but that acknowledges that the woman who bears the child is the one with the right 
to sell, donate, or raise that child.  
 
2. From your theoretical perspective, which point(s) is/are not negotiable, 
and which could be the basis for agreement with other perspectives? 
Although GPA is largely forbidden by national legislation, taking into 
account that it is in growing demand and expanding from Europe to third 
countries (from India to California), do you believe that the European law 
should proceed with its regulation and standardization? Or do you 
believe that European legislation already offers the tools for protection of 
the woman and the child, so as to contrast GPA as a normalized practice, 
avoiding recourse to regulation? 
 
Pilar Benavente Moreda7 (Madrid Autonomy University, Spain) − The questions posed 
lead us to the same reality analyzed from two different perspectives. On the one hand, if 
surrogacy should be admitted by domestic legislation, and if so under what conditions, and 
should this be the case what limits are essential for its regulation. On the other hand, what 
position should European legislation take and if the means which it counts on are 
sufficient, faced with an unstoppable reality at an international level. 
																																								 																				
7 She is researcher of the CEAL (Proyecto de Cooperación Interuniversitaria UAM-SANTANDER with Latin 
America), on the theme Present and Future of Assisted Reproduction in the Family Law century in Spain and 
Latin America (Argentina, Chile and Mexico), legal, social and ethical aspects (CEAL-AL / 2015-02 Code). 
She had published several articles and teach on the Assisted Reproduction Techniques, one recent publication 
as editor with Esther Farnós Amorós, Treinta años de Reproducción asisitida en España: una mirada 
interdisciplinaria a un fenómeno global y actual. Monographic number of «Boletín del Ministerio de 
Justicia», LXIX, nº 2179-junio, 2015. 
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In response to these matters, my personal position, upon which my answer will be 
based, is that it is auspicable that surrogacy is accepted and regulated, provided that it is 
balanced on the grounds that essential limits should be applied.  
The second matter to be considered takes into account the same reality, but starting out 
from the undisputable and unquestionable fact that, more than just a personal opinion of 
being for or against surrogacy, reality and facts dictate regulation − seeing as there are 
already numerous births that have taken place in the last few decades using the 
aforementioned technique of assisted reproduction, under permissive laws (USA, Russia, 
India amongst others) and used by citizens of countries whose legislation prohibits or does 
not regulate such practices. Based on this, as I said, it is absolutely unquestionable, it is not 
possible to deny the evidence and not to try to give an adequate answer to the problems 
arising from determining the parentage of those born, considering their right to identity and 
its derivatives which the situation gives rise to or indeed the possible exploitation of the 
women who give themselves up for surrogacy services − voluntarily or involuntarily − as 
well as the problems of International Privacy Law due to the divergence of national laws 
on this issue (including the problem of international public order). 
Even if the first matter can be answered, taking our own ethical, juridical or even 
religious convictions into account, for or against surrogacy and where appropriate, 
considering if it is necessary or not to establish a limit to its acceptance, regarding the 
second matter, the international community must give an answer, as they have been trying 
to do since the Hague Conference years ago, which I will refer to later on, to establish 
criteria which will serve as essential support to confront an unstoppable reality. The 
response given up until now in my opinion is insufficient. 
Certainly, at a European level and through decisions made by the European Humans 
Rights Court, answers are being given to specific situations prioritizing the superior rights 
of the minor to attribute effects to surrogacy cases whose contractors were nationals of 
countries which completely prohibited this action (ECHR Judgment 26 june 2014, case 
Labassee vs. France; 29 june 2014, case Mennenson vs France o 27 january 2015, case 
Paradiso and Campanelli vs. Italy), the cases of Laboire v. France and Foulon v. France 
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still awaiting resolution. Nevertheless, such decisions oppose those taken in the internal 
framework of each nation, such as the Spanish Supreme Court’s ruling on 6th February 
2014 and later Decision on 2nd February 2015, in which the High Court rejected the 
registration in the Birth Register of two minors, of Spanish parentage, born in California, 
resolving in a different manner the ruling taken by the European Humans Rights Court, 
with the understanding that such a case would weaken domestic public order as surrogacy 
is a forbidden practice in Spain, which implies the commercialization of pregnant women; 
in any event, the interests of the minors were abundantly protected by the possibility of 
determining the parentage of the client who gave their genetic material (ex.art. 10.2 
LTRHA 2006), the spouse being able to later adopt the minors. It was understood, hence, 
that the circumstances were different to those established in the cases resolved by 
Strasbourg, in the framework of the existence of a prohibitive norm (art.10 LTRHA) but 
considering that Spanish legislation did not leave the minors unprotected, as their 
parentage could be legally determined. ### 
In any case it remains evident, as the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference in 
2015 manifested (https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d96dd6e7««94e3-4b17-8cf8-
b0342fc92f53.pdf), that despite the decisions taken by the ECHR there are still a number 
of linked matters that remain unresolved, such as the evaluation of the implementation of 
the requisites of Article 8 of the ECHR in relation to the legal parentage of the children in 
the cases in which the circumstances of the case cannot be compared to those of the 
Mennesson / Labassee cases, and the response to the wider preoccupations that arise 
particularly in the context of surrogacy. All of which is caused by the absence of an 
international regulation of the subject.  
As I already stated, my opinion is in favour of permissive regulation of surrogacy. This 
is something that obviously, at a national level, stays within the States´margin of 
apprecitation; hence, under no circumstance should European legislature or a Union 
European court of justice be able to impose on a case, yet nevertheless it should safeguard 
the superior interests in conflict − of those born as a result of assisted reproduction and of 
the surrogate mothers as well as the rest of the interests concerned. If we analyse the matter 
	
342 
starting from the fact, already stated, that numerous children are born from this practice, 
we should not only answer the problem at an international level, but also reject the 
possibility of this practice existing at a domestic level on behalf of the member countries. It 
is equivalent to establishing a dividing line between those who can make use of the same 
practice outside their country and those who do not have access to such an option, within a 
country with prohibitive regulations. 
On the other hand, only by regulating the matter can parameters be established within 
which the permissive regulation limits can be fixed and at the same time protect the 
interests of those involved. The recent reform operated in Portugal can serve as an example 
(Law 32/2006, of 26th July, of medically assisted Reproduction, by Decree 27/XIII which 
regulates the access to surrogacy (in force since 1st July 2016.) According to this (art. 8) 
surrogacy is exceptional in character and cost free in the case of the absence of a uterus, or 
lesions or damage to this organ that make it absolutely and completely impossible to 
become pregnant, or in situations that are clinically justified. Furthermore, it is limited to 
pregnancy in which the gametes come from at least one of the beneficiaries, the mother 
never being able to provide her own genetic material. Additionally, previous authorization 
is required from the National Counsel on Medically Assisted Reproduction, it being 
expressively prohibited when there exists a subordinate economical relationship between 
the implicated parts, either of a working nature or a loan service. 
Another example is the failed art. 562 from the Draft Civil and Commercial Code of 
Argentina (message from the National Executive Power n. 884/2012), in which in order for 
a surrogacy agreement to be valid the following is required: previous consent, informed 
and free, of the implicated parts; juridical homologation after accrediting the attention of 
the superior interest of the child; full capacity and good physical and mental health 
condition of the mother to be; gametes provided from at least one of the contractors and the 
impossibility of them conceiving or carrying a pregnancy to full term; the inexistence of 
genetic material from the surrogate mother; absence of compensation; limitation of the 
number of surrogacy processes of the surrogate mother; and finally, that the surrogate 
mother has previously given birth to at least one child. 
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This is not the place to analyze each of the legal texts in which this matter is expressly 
regulated. However, we can state, taking as an example the cases explained above, that at 
least in both of them impassable limits are taken into consideration that have to do 
specifically with what we can call NON NEGOTIABLE ISSUES in relation to a potential 
regulation of surrogacy. These issues mainly concern the following: 
a) The autonomy and rights of the pregnant women and their right to decide over their 
own body making it compatible with a project of the future life of a child which does not 
end with the agreement of the wishes of the parties, but affects the very process of 
pregnancy, without which limits on their rights and ability to decide could be implicated. 
b) The necessary and non-waivable protection of those born through these techniques 
of assisted reproduction, acquiring the same rights as any child regardless of how they 
were created: nationality, social protection, determination of parentage, birth registration, 
amongst other matters. 
c) The need for those born from these techniques to be protected and to have a unique 
parentage determined from their birth. The right of these minors to an identity should not 
be violated. 
In any case, only from a serious reflection on the current state of surrogacy in Europe 
and the rest of the world, can these issues, which are or have to be nonnegotiable in this 
matter, be developed. 
In order to do so, it is pertinent to approach the matter starting from the work carried out 
since 2010 in The Hague Conference (https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-
projects/parentage-surrogacy) in relation to the way that the Member States deal with the 
topic of surrogacy. 
It is thus imperative to demonstrate those aspects that the Expert Group who was 
assigned the project on surrogacy highlighted as fundamental in the latest conclusions 
presented, to date, in their February 2016 report (https://assets.hcch.net/docs/abf15fe3-
18dc-4155-867b-2aaefe5016ed.pdf). Such aspects are related fundamentally to the 
necessary protection of the interests of the minors born from surrogacy, due to the absence 
of uniform legislation in the different member countries (determining single parentage 
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from the beginning, nationality, cross-border problems...) and the problems derived from 
the absence of regulation in terms of competence or jurisdiction. These aspects are 
resumed subsequently, as a pending subject on the topic, on which an international 
consensus should exist: 
a) The absence of uniform private international law rules or approaches with respect 
to the establishment and contestation of parentage can lead to conflicting legal statuses 
across borders and create significant problems for children and families, e.g. uncertain 
paternity or maternity, limping parental status, uncertain identity of the child, immigration 
problems, uncertain nationality or statelessness of the child, abandonment without 
maintenance. The Group recognised that common solutions are needed to address these 
problems.  
b) Children’s legal parentage is an issue of international concern and it is the gateway 
through which many of the obligations of adults to children flow. It is a legal status from 
which children derive many important rights (e.g. identity, nationality, maintenance, 
inheritance). It was noted that the topic of private international law rules on parentage has 
not been included in existing Hague Conventions so far.  
c) Regarding ART and ISAs, the Group noted that a majority of States do not have 
specific private international law rules and, as a result, apply in such cases their general 
private international law rules.  
d) Regarding jurisdiction, the Group noted that issues can arise in the context of legal 
parentage being established by or arising from: (1) birth registration; (2) voluntary 
acknowledgment of legal parentage; or (3) judicial proceedings. Issues can also arise in the 
context of the contestation of legal parentage. 
e) The Group was of the view that it would be useful to have further discussions, in 
particular, on the feasibility of indirect jurisdiction rules.  
f)  The Group thought further consideration of uniform applicable law rules was 
needed and was of the view that it would be useful to have further discussions on the 
feasibility of unifying the connecting factors that States use for the purpose of determining 
which law to apply.  
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g) The Group was of the view that it would be useful to have further discussions on 
the feasibility of unifying the rules on the recognition of foreign public acts and judicial 
decisions on parentage, taking into account public policy concerns, including those 
stipulated in domestic law.  
h)  The Group noted that surrogacy arrangements are prohibited in some States, 
permitted in other States and unregulated in others. The Group recognised concerns at the 
international level regarding public policy considerations on all those involved with 
surrogacy arrangements, such as the uncertain legal status of children and the potential for 
exploitation of women, including surrogate mothers.  
 
Antonia Durán Ayago8 (University of Salamanca, Spain) − We must start from the fact 
that, while in many European countries gestation substitution is not legalized, this does not 
prevent people who need to move to countries where this technique is allowed from being 
like fathers / mothers. When the child is born, in the country of birth s/he is registered as a 
child of principals, but they may have trouble when they want to enroll in the Civil 
Registry of the State of origin of the parents. In Spain, the General Direction of Registries 
and Notaries published an Instruction on October 5, 2010 in which it was allowing, under 
conditions, the inscription of these children born by gestation for substitution abroad in our 
Civil Registry. Specifically, the basic requirements are as follows: 1) the existence of a 
strong foreign court decision certifying the transfer parentage and 2) that there has been no 
infringement of the interests of the child and the rights of the pregnant woman. In 
particular, one will have to check that the assent of the pregnant woman has been obtained 
in free and voluntary form, without any error, fraud or violence and has enough natural 
ability. [?] 
Note that in Spain the surrogacy arrangement is null and therefore intentional pregnancy 
affiliation derived from substitution in our system is not regulated. But reality imposed the 
need to provide legal certainty to the minor so that this stopgap measure was reached, 
																																								 																				




which of course is not the best solution, but has so far been arbitrated. An extensive 
treatment of the situation in Spain on this issue can be found at 
http://www.millenniumdipr.com/archivos/1441706352.pdf.  
It is absolutely necessary to set common parameters globally (Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, which is already working on the issue 
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy) and at the 
European level to ensure that children born through gestational substitution have their 
filiation determined from their birth in favour of the parents constituents. Concerning the 
pregnant woman, it will be necessary to guarantee that her consent is free and informed. 
With respect to the intending parents, it will be necessary to guarantee the fulfilment of 
their procreational will. 
 
Susanne L. Goessl9 (University of Tulane, U.S.A.) and Sophie Dannecker10 (University 
of Bonn, Germany) − The practice of gestational surrogacy (GPA) is a very complex issue 
in terms of the social, economic and legal impacts it has on all the affected parties. This 
assertion is from a legal perspective and serves to reflect briefly on social, economic and 
legal impacts, assuming that a legal intervention takes into account all aspects of a human 
life. 
Currently, German law prohibits the medical practice of GPA. Despite this and not 
surprisingly, the legal position does not have the effect of obliterating the practice entirely. 
In fact, the practice is shifted to other countries. This issue becomes especially problematic 
in cases where the practice occurs under critical circumstances, mainly in developing 
countries, which can result in infringement on the basic human rights for the people 
involved.  
																																								 																				
9 She is (Dr. LL.M. Tulane) senior research assistant at the Institute for German, European and International 
Family Law at the University of Bonn. She has published broadly on questions of cross-border surrogacy 
from the German legal point of view. 
10 She works at the Institute for German, European and International Family Law and furthermore at the Käte 
Hamburger Centre for Advanced Study Law as Culture in Bonn. Her research interest is mainly focused on 
human rights law in general and womens’ and childrens’ rights in particular in a global and cultural context. 
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The outsourcing of gestational surrogacy does not avoid the controversial aftermath of 
the practice itself; it also creates fundamental legal problems that are imported back once 
the intended parents wish to return to Germany with their new family member.  
In the past few years several cases concerning foreign gestational surrogacy and 
recognition of parenthood were decided in German courts.11 The legal process is not only 
time consuming and a financial burden, it also has a significant impact on the physiological 
wellbeing of the people involved. As German nationality mainly follows the principle of 
‘ius sanguinis’, this can lead to a situation in which the child is denied a passport or visa 
and therefore not allowed to enter the German territory even though the foreign state does 
not allow him or her any permission to stay, either. In many cases, disputes between the 
German diplomatic missions in the country where the child is born and local courts can last 
for months and years on end. 
 Finally, last year the German last instance court (Bundesgerichtshof) decided that the 
recognition of parenthood of the intended parents does not per se violate German public 
policy. Nevertheless, several questions remain open. Hence the court needs to balance the 
rights of the different parties, which under German law would favour the intended parents 
and the protection of the family, following Art. 6 I GG (German Basic Law) and Art. 8 
EMRK (European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms), especially if the intended parents already have an established bond with the 
child. The gestational carrier, though [?], holds the right to parent their own child 
following Art. 6 (2) (1) GG, which also applies to the intended father in case he was the 
sperm donor of the child and the intended mother, in case she was the egg donor. The legal 
representative of the child can claim the protection of the best interest of the child and its 
personality, deriving from Art. 6 (2) GG, Art. 2 (1) GG and Art. 1 (1) GG. Additionally, 
the child has the right to know about his parentage from both paternal sides, according to 
																																								 																				
11 Whereas due to German law if the child would have been born in Germany, the gestational mother would 
be the mother and if the child would be born in marriage, the husband of the gestational mother automatically 
holds the legal position of being the father, §§ 1591 ff. BGB (German Civil Code).  
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Art. 2 (1) GG, Art. 1 (1) GG, and the right to be protected from being stateless, following 
Art. 2 (1) GG, 1 (1) GG.  
The aforementioned decision only dealt with the situation of surrogacy obtained abroad 
where a foreign Court decided about the question of paternity. The surrogate mother did 
not claim any rights to be involved, as she was not the genetic mother. On the other hand, 
one of the intended parents was indeed the genetic father. The corresponding judgment of 
paternity was recognized in Germany. The question remains open whether the genetic link 
between intended parents and child is relevant and how a case will be handled where a 
foreign court decision is missing. 
The current legal position in Germany, prohibiting GPA under all circumstances, 
creates legal uncertainty, especially for the two most vulnerable individuals involved, the 
child and the gestational surrogate, who are exposed to the practice and are object of 
different interest. As seen, it does not prevent intended parents from travelling abroad and 
circumventing this prohibition. 
The authors therefore question whether a regulation of the prohibition could instead 
better serve the interest of the child, redefining it from an individual who is stigmatized 
because begot in an “illegal” way, to a person whose rights are monitored during 
pregnancy and after birth. 
To achieve its purpose, the regulation must provide a way that enables the protection of 
the basic rights involved and their adequate balance. Three main aspects must be taken into 
consideration in this respect: (1) the identification of the rights at stake, (2) the intensity of 
their derogation and (3) the vulnerability of the parties and their actual - not just theoretical 
- possibility to seek legal aid. These three indicators might serve as orientation for drafting 
the standard for a regulation and could be used as a unique scale in case the regulation is 
not met by the procedure of GPA being undertaken abroad.  
The rights of the gestational mother are significantly affected through all aspects of 
pregnancy, including the act of giving the baby away afterwards. She is physically and 
psychologically involved, her mental and physical wellbeing is influenced by the process 
of pregnancy and the delivery. 
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Therefore, the authors propose to only allow surrogacy (or at least facilitate the 
recognition from surrogacy abroad) when her wellbeing is guaranteed and it has been made 
sure that she was not coerced or pressured into her decision to act as a surrogate mother, to 
deliver the child and to hand it over to the intended parents. Furthermore, there should be 
regulations according her the right to meet the child later or at least the possibility to be 
informed about his or her development.  
Whereas the intended parents are certainly better off and can afford the financial burden 
of a trial, the gestational mother who undertook this task initially to improve her financial 
situation may not have the means to access legal aid when she feels that her rights are 
being violated. In addition, the gestational mother may not be aware of her rights and in 
most cases she will have signed a surrogacy contract which regulates all variables pre and 
post pregnancy in favour of the intended parents and the surrogacy agency.  
The anticipated parents choose surrogacy as a method of extending the family when 
they face challenges relating to fertility, including same sex partnerships. The wish of 
having a child that is genetically related as a result of being a sperm or egg donor is a 
fundamental one, yet the question arises whether this wish of becoming a parent is a right 
in itself. As the use of surrogacy can easily slide into abuse of the surrogate mother and 
therefore a derogation of her rights as a person, surrogacy should be limited to cases where 
the intended parents have tried other techniques and got a medical advice on that matter or 
to cases where, due to a same sex partnership, a pregnancy is physically not possible. 
Furthermore, it should be assured that the intended parents will take full responsibility of 
the child and the surrogate mother even before birth, as in providing all necessary financial 
means to ensure medical observation during pregnancy and that they will be held 
responsible for the following procedure of providing a caring family and acting in the best 
interest of the child. Furthermore, they should also be obliged to offer the surrogate mother 
and the child the possibility to keep later contact (if wished). 
The surrogate mother must also fulfil some preconditions to qualify as a surrogate. 
Besides medical qualification, the states should ensure that she has all the necessary 
information about legal and actual consequences of surrogacy regarding herself and the 
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child. For instance, she could be obliged to attend independent legal counselling, to be paid 
by the intended parents, during which her surrogacy contract and the legal consequences 
will be explained to her. Furthermore, there should be regulation on the question whether 
she can change her mind and keep the child as her own. This is all the more relevant in 
cases where she is also the genetic mother. 
The child involved is also subjected to decisions that will eventually affect its personal 
development at a social and economic level. The best interest of the child is thereby 
defined by a third person and not by the child itself. His or her rights should therefore be 
protected, including the right to have at least two responsible parents but also the 
possibility to know about his or her origins and get to know the surrogate mother if he or 
she would like to.  
Finally, the legislator should regulate whether commercial surrogacy must be prohibited 
or not. While it should be assured that the intended parents meet costs of the surrogate 
mother’s pregnancy and further medical or social necessities which might result from the 
surrogacy, the legislator should be very careful when giving economic incentives that may 
start a surrogacy “trade”. On the one hand, this is ethically highly problematic, at least 
from the German legal point of view, as respect for human dignity prohibits any 
objectification of the human body.12 On the other hand, allowing commercial surrogacy 
may encourage poor women to become surrogate mothers as a profession and might also 
attract surrogacy agencies, especially in developing countries, to exploit poor women.  
Therefore, we propose to only allow altruistic surrogacy and make sure that it remains 
the exception in human reproduction. A regulation of those exceptions should be 
considered to avoid abuse or exploitation. If a national legislator wants to prohibit it in his 
country, at least she should regulate under which circumstances the recognition of the 
intended parents’ paternity can be possible to maintain the best interest of the child who 
has already been born. 
																																								 																				
12 Prostitution is only allowed if the woman’s free will is ensured in every moment of the procedure. This, on 




Anika König13 (Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, and Universität Luzern, Switzerland) − 
Surrogacy is a practice that is not going to go away. In its traditional form it has existed for 
a very long time (we can find examples of this even in the Bible). And in the form of 
gestational surrogacy, it is in growing demand. Even when surrogacy markets, such as in 
India or Thailand are closed down, new clinics open in other countries and the market 
moves there. In my opinion, more regulation and better control will contribute to the 
surrogates’ and children’s protection, rather than bans or inadequate regulation. Especially 
when the practice is banned, surrogates have no ways of claiming their rights. In addition, 
intended parents who would like to do surrogacy in a responsible and fair way will not be 
able to do so. Instead, they will be forced to perform surrogacy in illegal contexts which do 
not provide protection to the different parties involved and make all of them unnecessarily 
vulnerable. 
 
Laura Nuño Gómez14 (University of Juan Carlos Madrid, Spain) − We cannot analyse 
commercial surrogacy without taking into account the counter-geographies of globalization 
(as described by Saskia Sassen) that are extending and diversifying the forms of 
exploitation and appropriation of the bodies and lives of women; especially those in a 
situation of extreme poverty. Destitution markets that turn poverty and need into lucrative 
business niches. The debate on the legalization of commercial surrogacy can’t be settled on 
the wishes of each and every one of us nor on the alleged individual liberty of the 
surrogates, which is not only false, but irrelevant. In a globalized context of feminization 
of poverty and rearmament of patriarchal neoliberalism, the ethical requirements that 
would guarantee the imperative autonomy of free will are not applicable. The debate needs 
																																								 																				
13 See note 4.  
14 She writes about herself and the theme of this TR: «Mercantilization of women’s body, and in this context, 
surrogacy, is among the research areas of the Gender Equality Observatory of URJC, which I am Director of, 
and I have been linked to research projects on this issue for 10 years». 
She is political scientist, researcher and feminist activist. Director of the Chair of the Institute of Public 
Gender and Equality Observatory law at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos and proponent of the first academic 
degree in Spain on Gender, she is the author of many articles and books (El mito del varón sustentador, Icaria 
Editorial, Barcelona 2010). Ever since its creation (by the law Ley para la igualdad efectiva de mujeres y 
hombres), she is member of the Consejo Estatal de Participación de la Mujer.   
	
352 
to take into account that, quite apart from commercial interests or personal wishes, public 
policies regulate the rules of civil coexistence. Legality grants legitimacy and both 
establish together an ethical framework that can’t be defined by the “greater evil” of no 
regulation nor by the “lesser evil” of standardization, but rather by choosing common 
good. Common good must be based on the right to dignity and physical and moral integrity 
of each and every human being and the right of minors to have a non-commercializable 
guardianship. The right to be a mother or a father does not exist, as much as one might 
desire it to. Legalizing commercial surrogacy has serious ethical implications, like, for 
example, allowing anyone with a sufficient economic capacity to buy a human being, 
imposing on the more vulnerable women the physical and psychological effects of 
pregnancy and establishing a censitary citizenship where only those with sufficient 
economic resources can guarantee that the free market will provide them human beings on 
demand. Human beings cannot be sold, despite how much one might desire them, want 
them or want to buy them. 
 
Cinzia Picciocchi15 (University of Trento, Italy) − As a constitutional lawyer, my 
perspective deals with the legal regulation of surrogacy and the protection of fundamental 
rights. The development of assisted reproduction techniques had a great impact on the 
definition of family and there are many examples of laws describing in detail who is to be 
considered as ‘a mother’ or as ‘a father’ and who is not to be considered as such, from the 
legal point of view. One well-known example in this regard is the UK law on assisted 
reproduction (HFEA Act, 2008), whose sec. 33 to 47 are devoted to this matter. 
From an overall perspective, there is an ongoing process of dissociation between the 
biological and the (so to say) social perspective of what family is and, consequently, how it 
should be defined from the legal perspective. Definitions like ‘social’ or ‘non-biological’ 
																																								 																				
15 She is a comparatist and constitutionalist scholar, member of the research group BioDiritto 
(www.bidiritto.org) of the Trento University Faculty of Law. She teaches Constitutional law and Biolaw and 
Ethics. She is taking part in various research projects related to the impact of the new biomedical technologies 
on the individual rights. She has published several articles and two monographies about the theme of 
therapeutic freedom and cultural rights, and constitutional dignity. 
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parent, ‘gestational mother’, ‘biological’ mother or father, ‘gametes donors’ are used to 
illustrate this phenomenon, showing the need but also the difficulties of adopting a legal 
regulation and coping with the dissociation between sociological, biological and legal 
aspects of parenthood. 
Genetic ties are becoming less relevant and ‘family’ appears to be as a group of people 
sharing love and affection, rather than (or at least irrespective of) biological features. 
Nevertheless, surrogacy raises many questions, which go far beyond the impact of 
assisted reproduction techniques on parenthood and deal with the fundamental rights at 
stake, with regard to all the subjects involved: parents which will raise the child (the so 
called ‘social parents’), the possible donors of gametes (egg and sperm, if provided) and, 
most of all, the surrogate mother and – of course – the child. 
I think that health and autonomy of the surrogate mother and the ‘best interest’ of the 
child raise serious concerns and that explains why many States chose to outlaw surrogacy 
tout court. 
Many fundamental rights of the gestational mother are at stake (like, for example: health 
rights, custody rights, abortion decisions and so on) but I think they might be summed up 
in one word: self – determination, which requires that surrogacy (with all its implications) 
is the result of free choice. Social and financial constraints might affect individual 
autonomy, inducing women to become surrogate mothers under economic need. 
Significantly, the Thailand government decision to ban surrogacy agreements for foreign 
couples, limiting it to Thai citizens under certain circumstances, came after the well-known 
“baby Gummy scandal” and aimed, as it has been reported: «to stop Thai women’s wombs 
from becoming the world’s womb» (Wanlop Tankananurak, member of Thailand’s 
National Legislative Assembly, Reuters)16. 
I think that prohibition tout court is not effective and, if women’s autonomy is at stake, 





where women in vulnerable economic conditions are more likely to enter surrogacy 
agreements. 
Surrogacy exists and it should be regulated, preventing commercial agreements, and 
favoring surrogacy which is based on solidarity, for example allowing only expenses 
reimbursement (e.g. medical and insurances costs), which should be proportional to the 
average income in the country where the agreement takes place.  
The other fundamental right at stake is the best interest of the child. The European court of 
human rights has ruled that States should «to ensure that a child is not disadvantaged on 
account of the fact that he or she was born to a surrogate mother» and that the best interest 
of the child should be considered as a priority, disregarding the fact that the parents have 
circumvented the prohibition of surrogacy in their own country (see for example the case of 
Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, ECHR, 27 January 2015, ap. n. 25358/12 – referred to the 
Grande Chambre on 1 June 2015 and the case of Mennesson v. France, ap.n. 65192/11 
Labassee v. France, Application n. 65941/11, ECHR 26 June 2014). Courts should take into 
consideration, for example, the circumstance in which parents seeking surrogacy have been 
deemed “unfit” for adoption.  
Provided that the fundamental rights of these subjects are taken into consideration and 
protected, law should regulate the relation between gestational mother and the (same-sex 
or opposite-sex) couple, with regard to the aspects like, for example, abortion and the 
consequences in case the surrogate mother changes her mind and wants custody of the 
child. These were some of the most controversial issues raised in custody battles between 
couples and surrogate mothers. 
Again, the adoption of legislation only at regional level (European for example) would 
be ineffective, as people would bypass State prohibitions simply going abroad, thus 
disregarding laws providing for the protection of the fundamental rights at stake.  
I think that international agreement is crucial to regulate a global phenomenon like 




Judit Zeller17 (University of Pécs, Hungary) − Notwithstanding all ethical, psychological 
and legal ambivalence, surrogacy has fought its way through in many legal systems by 
now. GPA is a highly complex issue, embracing questions that go from the nature of 
parenthood, through bodily integrity to freedom of contract. Considering the above, I 
would only like to highlight a few moments that may be worth further reflection. 
However questionable, at the end of the day GPA can indeed contribute to female 
empowerment and equality, for the following reasons: 1. Surrogacy helps to reduce female 
infertility and the social stigma attached to this condition. Through GPA, women who are 
not able or not willing18 to carry a pregnancy to term or give birth, have the possibility – 
just like their male counterparts – to have a genetic offspring. In the process of natural 
conception women have a double role: providing gametes and providing the necessary 
environment for the embryo to develop into a baby. This also means a double chance to be 
considered as infertile: in the case of not being able to provide eggs and not being able to 
provide the “appropriate” womb to bring the pregnancy to term. Surrogacy may 
reconstruct this double requirement towards women. 2. Considering the other party of the 
surrogate agreement, women have the opportunity to make economic use of their unique 
physical capacity of bringing children into the world, or use this capacity to evolve their 
altruism towards other women. If men seek advantage of their physical capacity at work, 
why shouldn’t women do this as well?  
Speaking of commercial surrogacy, however, inevitably leads us to the possibility of 
exploitation of disadvantaged women, where the anti-essentialist perspective has to be 
taken seriously. Reproductive tourism is a common phenomenon and the motives are not 
always and not only rigid legal provisions. Surrogacy is usually cheaper in developing 
																																								 																				
17 She is graduated from the University of Pécs (Hungary) with a degree in law and psychology and holds a 
PhD in law. She is currently working as an assistant professor at the Department of Constitutional Law of the 
University of Pécs. Her research focuses on challenges of human rights in the 21st century, especially in the 
field of health care and medical research. Parallel to her academic career, she is also active in the NGO sector 
as an expert on human rights of vulnerable groups. She has work experience as a legal officer from the Office 
of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, where she engaged in the children’s rights project and later in 
torture prevention. 
18 Although it has to be mentioned that women who are not willing to bring a pregnancy to term because of 
the fear of their postpartum body image are certainly victims of the pressure exercised by homosocial culture. 
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countries, for intended parents from Western Europe or USA even in Eastern European 
countries, indicating that huge differences exist in the measure of compensation of 
surrogate mothers. This is a phenomenon that should definitely be tackled – even if it is 
questionable how realistic this fight against inequality might be. 
Many countries choose to adopt the altruistic surrogacy model to avoid the 
abovementioned exploitation of the disadvantaged. At first glance, altruistic surrogacy also 
guarantees that GPA is not considered a modern form of slavery, or – as some indicate – a 
certain form of prostitution. In my opinion, however, this is an excessively optimistic 
attitude, not counting on possible illegal payments made to the surrogate mother outside 
the contract. The exclusivity of altruistic surrogacy may develop a certain “grey zone” of 
surrogacy agreements. This might blur relationships leading to an even greater exploitation 
of the disadvantaged, as their claim for compensation is not even in the contract, therefore 
not enforceable in court. 
Turning to a rights-based approach, a non-negotiable point is – besides the awareness of 
the best interest of the child, which, I think, is obvious – the equal access to surrogacy. If 
legally allowed, surrogacy shall be accessible to couples – irrespective of their sexual 
orientation – and to singles on an equal basis.19 The regulation should provide just 
conditions to everyone and be consistent with the provisions concerning other assisted 
reproductive techniques as well as those of adoption (e.g. if singles are allowed to adopt, 
they should be allowed to take part in surrogacy arrangements as intended parents). 
Equality should come forward in establishing legal parenthood as well. Although I have 
argued for surrogacy being a means for equality per se, when addressing the regulatory 
framework, we might see that women are still in a less favourable position than men if they 
intend to establish their legal status as a mother. Although some experts have already urged 
for a change, legal systems are still based on the ancient Roman principle of mater semper 
certa est. Following this principle means that the intended mother is not entitled to 
																																								 																				
19 Current UK regulation, for example, makes it harder for lesbian couples to establish their legal parenthood 




challenge the motherhood of the surrogate mother. Bearing the importance of human 
relationships in mind, I think this is the point where the equality principle should kick in, 
transforming maternity into a rebuttable presumption instead of basing motherhood on the 
fact of giving birth. 
 
